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THE VICISSITUDES OF TORT: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS RABIN, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY
Catherine M. Sharkey*
INTRODUCTION
Professors Robert Rabin, Anthony Sebok, and Benjamin Zipursky
explore predictability and tort doctrine from three different vantage
points. Professor Rabin takes a historical approach, presenting two
dichotomies-liability rules versus standards and make-whole versus
categorical approaches to damages-as lenses through which to ex-
plore the precarious role of predictability in the evolution of tort doc-
trine.1 Professor Sebok showcases champerty, a much maligned form
of third-party litigation financing, and argues that it should be charac-
terized as a form of a socially valuable quasi-insurance risk-distribu-
tion mechanism as opposed to a shunned form of gambling. 2 And,
finally, Professor Zipursky offers a critique of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' and the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Snyder
v. Phelps-a case in which the picketing of anti-gay religious protes-
tors at the funeral of a military soldier was protected by the First
Amendment and thus insulated from tort liability for invasion of pri-
vacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress-as a misguided
"jurisprudential critique" of the unpredictable, open-textured nature
of liability standards of privacy and emotional distress torts.3
Three themes pervade these rich articles. First, I explore the use of
unpredictability as a code word for an assault on tort doctrine in re-
sponse to an out-of-control tort system. In Professor Rabin's histori-
cal account of the evolution of tort from a predominantly rules-based
tort system through an explosion of standards-based, open-textured
tort liability to a resting equipoise of standards hemmed in by rules at
the outer boundaries, rules are linked with limited tort liability and
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Elliot Tarloff provided excellent
research assistance.
1. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and
Remedies, 60 DEPAut L. Ri-v. 431 (2011).
2. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to
Insurance, 60 DEPAU] L. Rvv. 453 (2011).
3. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Tex-
ture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REv. 473 (2011).
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standards are tied to expansive tort liability. Yet this correspon-
dence-while perhaps unassailable as an overarching descriptive
trend-is by no means inherent in the nature of rules. Rules, in other
words, can operate in both directions, not only as a one-way down-
ward ratchet on tort liability, but also in a pro-liability direction. Ra-
bin focuses on the canonical "no duty" rules of the nineteenth century
and the contemporary rules-based limitations on open-textured liabil-
ity in the twentieth century. But largely missing from this historical
account is the story of rules promoting tort liability, such as strict lia-
bility, vicarious liability, negligence per se, and the like.
Second, I probe the link between unpredictability and insurance.
Here, when confronting unpredictability, those future elements or
contingencies susceptible to measurement (risks) must be separated
from those elements defying measurement (uncertainty)-or, to use
Mark Geistfeld's preferred term, ambiguity.4 Risks are insurable,
whereas ambiguity is not (at least not until it can be tamed by predic-
tions and measurement). But our social institutions of insurance are
not guided by economics alone. Thus, Professor Sebok's efforts to
distinguish champerty from illegal gambling and to analogize it to a
form of insurance will inevitably fall short of establishing social ac-
ceptance or embrace of the practice.
Third, I highlight the role of the U.S. Supreme Court and its incur-
sions into the state law domain of tort in the name of predictability.
Punitive damages have been a target over the past fifteen years, with
the Court struggling under the rubric of substantive and procedural
due process to rein in unwieldy awards. With Exxon Shipping v.
Baker, the Court singled out unpredictability as the root problem of
punitive damages and imposed a rule-like outer bound (a ratio of 1:1
punitive to compensatory damages).5 Professor Rabin is doubtful that
the U.S. Supreme Court will achieve great strides in this endeavor to
quell unpredictability. Professor Zipursky has considerable angst
about the Court's making inroads into privacy and emotional distress
torts. Both of these cases raise the possibility that the U.S. Supreme
Court is engaging in a direct challenge to settled tort doctrine. Such
incursions are in keeping with the Court's longer-term project of pro-
cedural reform of the civil litigation system in the name of unpredict-
ability, but are novel in their ambition to launch frontal attacks.
4. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60 DE7PAUL L.
REv 539, 539 (2011).
5. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
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II. "No DurY" RULES AND PRO-LIABILITY RULES IN PURSUIT
OF PREDICTABILITY
In contemporary debate, "unpredictability" has become a code
word for an assault on tort doctrine in response to a tort system spin-
ning out of control. Predictability, however, need not be so ideologi-
cal. Predictability is a core rule-of-law precept, embodying the
fairness principle of treating like cases alike. In the age-old, rules-
versus-standards debate, predictability sides squarely with rules.6 But
tort rules, and their associated predictability, can work in a liability-
enhancing direction as well. In other words, there is no inherent link
between a rules-based orientation and the constriction of tort liability.
Professor Rabin, nonetheless, frames his historical discussion of un-
certainty with the perceived concerns of opening the "floodgates" of
liability and "crushing liability." Staving off these twin evils could be
accomplished, first and foremost, by a reduction in tort liability and
damages. Of course, clamping down on torts is one way to increase
certainty, but the increased predictability would seem to be a mere
byproduct of the main thrust to stymie tort liability. The main histori-
cal examples used throughout Professor Rabin's article fit the general
characterization of rules designed or deployed with the aim of keeping
tort liability within diminished bounds: the contributory negligence
rule, the tripartite division of entrants onto property, assumption of
risk, and the economic loss rule.7 In comparing rules to standards,
then, Professor Rabin overwhelmingly compares "no duty" rules with
more discretionary (and pro-liability) standards. Professor Rabin is
by no means blind to this-he writes: "As late as mid-twentieth cen-
tury, tort standards of reasonable conduct-and the concomitant un-
certainty inherent in case-by-case jury assessment of responsibility-
were sharply circumscribed by a constellation of proscriptive rules
(no-duty rules, by and large)." 8 But the historical association between
6. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J. LEGAL STu. 257, 265 (1974) (concluding that because rules restrict courts (the secondary
audience) they also make outcomes more predictable to regulated parties (the primary audi-
ence), which, in turn, encourages settlement of legal disputes); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cin. L. Riev. 1175, 1179 (1989) ("Predictability ... is a needful charac-
teristic of any law worthy of the name. There are times when even a bad rule is better than no
rule at all."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L.
Rrv. 22, 62 (1992) ("[R]ules afford certainty and predictability to private actors, enabling them
to order their affairs productively. Standards produce uncertainty, thereby chilling socially pro-
ductive behavior.").
7. 1 have long thought of the economic loss rule as the new manifestation of the now-defunct
privity boundary, designed to forge the dividing line between contracts and torts. Perhaps Lord
Abinger is vindicated here. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 431.
8. Id. at 435.
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no-duty rules and the urge for predictability may nonetheless have
skewed our contemporary perspective on the inherent link between
the two.
The key point is that rules, in pursuit of certainty and predictability,
could take us (at least theoretically) in two polar opposite directions
in tort. At one end point lies no-duty rules; at the opposite resides no-
fault rules of strict liability (or absolute liability).9
This latter pro-liability pole is (largely) curiously absent from Pro-
fessor Rabin's account.' 0 There are, however, some glimpses. In a
footnote reference, Professor Rabin mentions that Judge Cardozo "re-
sort[ed] to primary negligence as a matter of law as a device for nar-
rowing the scope of jury (read 'unpredictable') decision-making.""
Negligence per se stands out as a stark example of a tort rule that
operates in a distinctly pro-liability direction.12 Defendant's violation
of a legislative standard or regulation results in an automatic finding
9. See Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HAnv. L. Rvv. 713, 719 (1965) (advocating a transition to "a system of nonfault enter-
prise liability" that "assesses the costs of accidents to activities according to their involvement in
accidents"); see also Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YAILE L.J. 499, 520 n.55 (1961) (explaining how the current negligence system "certainly re-
suIts in less frequent liability damages than would a nonfault arrangement, [but] a nonfault sys-
tem might result in considerably smaller damage awards"); George L. Priest, The Invention of
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LiEGAL S-rUD. 461, 510-11 (1985) (tracing the justifications for enterprise liability to the judicial
opinions of Justice Traynor and the academic writings of Harper, James, and Prosser, which all
"recommended absolute liability for manufacturers to encourage prevention of defects and to
distribute risks broadly through the price of the product"). But see Richard A. Epstein, A The-
ory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (critiquing predominance of negligence liabil-
ity and developing a new approach to causation as the basis for a system of strict liability);
Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL
Sruo. 165 (1974) (discussing invalid defenses-including private necessity, third-party compul-
sion, best efforts, and mistaken belief-and valid defenses, such as causal defenses, assumption
of risk, and plaintiff's trespass, that should limit liability under a strict liability regime). Epstein's
approach clearly rejects the notion that strict liability is necessarily pro-liability, given these
structural limitations.
10. In previous work, Professor Rabin has argued that the ascension of enterprise liability had
more to do with the evolution of thinking "about the social function of the tort system," as
opposed to (as argued by Professor Priest and others) the transition from negligence to strict
liability. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L.
Rrv. 1190, 1193-94, 1198 (1996). He points to Rylands v. Fletcher and the blasting cases as
evidence that strict liability evolved contemporaneously with negligence liability. See id. at
1194-95. For my purposes here, I am interested not in the historical roots of enterprise liability,
but simply in the (uncontroversial) point that both strict liability and enterprise liability re-
present a "rule-like" approach to liability, as compared with negligence-based liability. It is this
aspect that is not fully recognized in Professor Rabin's present exploration of rules versus stan-
dards in tort law.
11. Rabin, supra note 1, at 433 n.13.
12. See Fleming James, Jr., Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L.
REV. 95, 107 (1950) ("[T]he negligence per se rule sometimes tends to expand liability in desira-
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of breach of a duty of care; plaintiff is relieved of the burden of prov-
ing this element in his or her particular case (as necessitated by the
standard of reasonable care). The rules-versus-standards debate plays
out in this context, but the pro-liability rules-based approach has
predominated over time.13
Professor Rabin's article provides additional hints-albeit subtle-
of the bidirectional possibilities of rules-based approaches. Professor
Rabin takes up the issue in "an often-overlooked corner of the world
of accident law": the independent contractor defense to a vicarious
liability claim in the hospital setting.14 In Roessler v. Novak, a Florida
appellate court reversed a summary judgment ruling in favor of the
defendant hospital and instead endorsed Florida's three-element test
of whether an independent contractor (in this case, a radiologist who
allegedly misinterpreted a scan) had "apparent authority," thus sub-
jecting the hospital to vicarious liability.15 Chief Justice Altenbernd
concurred separately to voice his concern that the movement away
from clear rules to a standards-based, case-by-case approach (the "ap-
parent authority" test) to determine a hospital's vicarious liability for
independent contractors has been an abject failure:
Patients, hospitals, doctors, nurses, other licensed professionals, risk
managers for governmental agencies, and insurance companies all
need to have predictable general rules establishing the parameters
of vicarious liability in this situation. Utilizing case-specific decisions
ble ways (along lines charted out by the legislature in ways which they as practical lawmakers
have found feasible).").
13. In Martin v. Herzog, Judge Cardozo gave the canonical expression of negligence per se as
conclusively establishing negligence: "We think the unexcused omission of statutory signals is
more than some evidence of negligence. It is negligence itself." 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920).
Robert Blomquist describes the evolution of the doctrine of negligence per se in the lead-up to
Martin v. Herzog:
[N]ineteenth century American judges started to utilize negligence per se parlance as a
shorthand way of describing certain types of conduct as negligent as a matter of law.
This approach was closely related to so-called rule of law assessments made by judges
in an "attempt to create specific rules of conduct that they ... declare to be the rule the
reasonable person will always follow."
Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble with Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. Rev. 221, 275 (2009) (sec-
ond alteration in original) (quoting DAN B. Donns, Tim LAw OF TORTS § 132, at 309 (2000)).
Judge Cardozo's rule-based approach has predominated. See, e.g., James, supra note 12, at 106
(describing the "majority" of American courts that follow the rule-based approach); Paul Sher-
man, Use of Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WurrflER L. RFV. 831, 880
(1992) (describing the majority approach to negligence per se whereby "[tihe standard of care
applied in negligence actions . . . is the standard adopted by the statute, and it borders on abso-
lute or strict liability").
14. Rabin, supra note 1, at 441.
15. Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), discussed in Rabin, supra
note 1, at 441-42.
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by individually selected juries . . . is inefficient, unpredictable and,
perhaps most important, a source of avoidable litigation.' 6
Professor Rabin borrows Chief Justice Altenbernd's words here to il-
lustrate the "ineradicable tension between rules and standards."' 7
For my purposes, what is equally significant is that the Chief Jus-
tice's predilection for rules does not operate as a one-way ratchet to-
wards lesser tort liability. He does not presume that movement away
from a case-by-case standards approach would be tantamount to de-
ciding that hospitals should be immune from the liability of indepen-
dent contractors. Rather, the Chief Justice would opt for a clear rule
in the interest of predictability, regardless of whether the chips fall in
a pro- or anti-liability direction: "Our society can undoubtedly func-
tion well and provide insurance coverage to protect the risks of mal-
practice if there is either broad liability upon the hospital for these
services as nondelegable duties or if liability is restricted to the inde-
pendent contractor."' 8 Unlike a single-minded focus on either the
"floodgates" of liability or "crushing" damages under the guise of pur-
suit of predictability, the evil here is the uncertainty itself associated
with standards-based decision making.
Moreover, this particular example invoked by Professor Rabin
raises an even more significant (yet unremarked upon) issue: What of
the dominance and acceptance of the rule of vicarious liability,
which-unlike the other examples discussed by Professor Rabin-
works indisputably in a pro-liability direction?
The historical evolution of this controversial species of strict liabil-
ity complicates Professor Rabin's account of the rules-versus-stan-
dards debate over time.' 9 Indeed, "[t]he way in which the modern
conception [of vicarious liability] has grown is, in fact, very compara-
ble to the method by which special liabilities are attached to innkeep-
ers, to those who have wild animals, to those who start a fire, to those
16. Roessler, 858 So. 2d at 1163 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring), quoted in Rabin, supra note 1,
at 441-42.
17. Rabin, supra note 1, at 441.
18. Roessler, 858 So. 2d at 1163 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added), quoted in
Rabin, supra note 1, at 441-42.
19. Here, I do not purport to resolve the controversy surrounding the historical origins of this
doctrine. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. RiV. 161,164 (1954) ("His-
torians are not agreed on the origins of the modern doctrine of vicarious liability in Anglo-
American law."); Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YAuI' L.J. 105, 105-06
(1916) ("In no branch of legal thought are the principles in such sad confusion."). Compare, e.g.,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. Riv. 345, 364 (1891) (tracing the doctrine to
the Roman, master-slave relationship and paterfamilias), with, e.g., John H. Wigmore, Responsi-
bility for Tortious Acts: Its History-II, 7 HARv. L. RiEv. 383, 383 (1894) (locating the origins of
the doctrine in the Germanic idea "that the master was to be held liable absolutely for harm
done by his slaves or servants").
[Vol. 60:695700
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who engage as public carriers." 20 Writing in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, Fleming James explicitly tied the liability-expanding doctrine of
vicarious liability to that of enterprise liability:
In the rest of the accident field there has been a typical common
law development which is gradually imposing a similar liability on
enterprises for the risks they inject into our society. . . . And by
fictions and procedural devices it has subordinated fault to the need
for compensation supported by enterprise liability. Vicarious liabil-
ity is one of the cornerstones of this newer structure. . . . As to the
master it is a form of strict liability based on the same philosophy as
workmen's compensation and involving similar assurances that
claims will be paid and widely distributed.21
By the end of the twentieth century, Gary Schwartz noted a trend
among academics and practitioners to justify vicarious liability on a
"deep pockets" rationale-a perspective that has led to the adoption
of multiple pro-liability doctrines and rules, such as joint-and-several
liability and strict liability for product manufacturers. 2 2  Whereas
"many of those [pro-]liability rules . . . have themselves been sub-
jected to legislative review and revision," vicarious liability stands out,
according to Schwartz, in that "no attention has been paid to [it]" dur-
ing this period of tort reform. 2 3
20. Laski, supra note 19, at 113 (footnotes omitted).
21. James, supra note 19, at 172 (footnotes omitted).
22. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69
S. CAL. L. Ri-v. 1739, 1744-45 (1995). The "deep pockets" rationale can be linked to the insol-
vency theory of vicarious liability. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93
YAurz L.J. 1231 (1983) (noting potential employee insolvency as one of two reasons-the other
being transaction costs in principal-agent negotiations-that vicarious liability should result in
more economically efficient allocation of liability); see also Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal
Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. Rev. 563 (1988) (applying the same economic analysis to justify "scope
of employment" limitations to vicarious liability but arguing that courts often fail to evaluate
appropriate factors in "scope of employment" analysis).
23. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1744. Schwartz thus concludes that "[a]s a practical matter
employer vicarious liability is not only untouchable, it is essentially invisible." Id. at 1745.
Professor Rabin seeks to qualify my claim that vicarious liability is pro-liability:
[V]icarious liability rests on the foundation of primary tort liability of a responsible
agent-whether that responsibility is premised on failure to adhere to a rule or a stan-
dard. Thus vicarious liability operates in a pro-liability direction in the secondary sense
of imputing liability to assure a solvent defendant.
Rabin, supra note 1, at 442 n.56. While there is no gainsaying Professor Rabin's description of
the doctrine of vicarious liability operating as secondary tort liability, his description of the doc-
trine still may understate its force. The doctrine's historical link to the development of enter-
prise liability and the extent to which the insolvency rationale is linked to the broader "deep
pockets" rationale, suggest that the domain of vicarious liability might be quite capacious. In the
end, Professor Rabin raises an intriguing empirical issue and a possible explanation for the "in-
visibility" of the doctrine as noted by Schwartz-namely that the impact on tort liability is mini-
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Predictability as a code word for an assault on the tort system ap-
plies equally, if not more strongly, to damages as to liability. As Pro-
fessor Rabin notes, state legislatures have enthusiastically embraced
caps and other limits on damages. Damage caps certainly result in
more predictability, 2 4 but, as in the case of no-duty rules, uncertainty
and unpredictability concerns take second seat to reducing "crushing
liability" and outlier damage awards. But-once again-at least in
theory, rule-like boundaries on jury (and less often, judge) awarded
damages do not have to operate in a unidirectional manner. Take, for
example, Blumstein and his coauthors' proposal for damage sched-
ules. Under their proposed reform, juries would have to justify
awards at both the high and low ends of damage ranges: "An unex-
plained outlier should constitute a prima facie case for either remitti-
tur or additur by the trial judge or an appellate holding of inadequacy
or excessiveness of the judgment." 25
Justice Traynor provides a final illustrative example that the desire
for rule-like constraints on damages need not operate in tandem with
a disdain for expansive liability regimes. As Professor Rabin de-
scribes, Justice Traynor, in his dissenting opinion in Seffert v. Los An-
geles Transit Lines,2 6 advocated an unusual position in support of
limits on noneconomic pain-and-suffering damages. "[Pain and suf-
fering damages] become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in
a mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly distribution
of losses through insurance and the prices of goods or of transporta-
tion." 27 This "quest for predictable assessment of risk," 28 however, is
a far cry from the tort reformer's complaint of crushing liability. It is
linked, instead, to an enterprise liability system, with insurance func-
tioning as a loss-spreading mechanism.
mal (at least as compared with the pro-liability rules that have been the subject of the tort
reform lobby's efforts).
Professor Rabin offers a "second qualification .. . that liability-enhancing 'rules' of strict liabil-
ity for defective products and abnormally dangerous activities are in practice far less clearly
categorized as 'rules."' Id. While I accept this assessment, I merely intend to emphasize that tort
law is textured with several pro-liability rules and doctrines that reveal that the impulse toward
predictability need not be considered inevitably linked with the agenda of limiting tort liability.
24. For this reason, caps on damages find prominent place on the lobbying agenda of insur-
ance companies. Geistfeld, supra note 4, at 565.
25. James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YAL J. ON Rio. 171, 179 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
26. Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961).
27. Id. at 345 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
28. Rabin, supra note 1, at 444.
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III. INSURABLE RISKS AND LIMITS ON THE QUEST
FOR PREDICTABILITY
The "quest for predictable assessment of risk"-inherent in insur-
ance-is not tantamount to an assault on tort doctrine. The last thing
an insurance company should clamor for is the end of tort liability, for
the insurance business would dry up alongside. Insurers want predict-
ability, not diminished liability.29
What is key to insurance as an economic matter is to distinguish risk
from uncertainty or (the preferred economic term) ambiguity. Risks
denote future events that occur with measurable probability. People
can thereby make arrangements to protect themselves against such
measurable uncertainty. By contrast, uncertainty or ambiguity applies
when the likelihood of future events is indefinite or incalculable. Un-
certainty or ambiguity, then-not tort liability-is the formidable foe
of insurance companies. Note the close correspondence here with the
insight from Part II: Insurance companies tend to favor rules-based
approaches, which themselves are associated with predictability, not
diminishment of tort liability. Recall Chief Justice Altenbernd's la-
ment over the standards-based approach to determining "apparent
authority" as an exception to the independent contractor defense to
vicarious liability. Not only did the Chief Justice remain indifferent as
to whether the alternative rules-based approach would be liability-en-
hancing or diminishing, but his consistent focus on eradicating the evil
of unpredictability was linked to insurance practice: "Our society can
undoubtedly function well and provide insurance coverage to protect
the risks of malpractice [only if we do something about] . . . [t]he un-
certainty of the current system." 3 0
29. In this vein, Kip Viscusi has urged insurers to end their fixation on numerical caps on
particular components of damages. See W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Reform and Insurance Markets, 7
RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 9 (2004). Viscusi notes that "the character of the reforms that have
been proposed to date often are not ideal. Past proposals have been designed strictly with re-
spect to the narrow objective of reducing insurance costs, which is not necessarily equivalent to
fostering sound insurance market performance." Id. at 10. To illustrate this point, he also points
out that "if such [liability reform] policies were taken to the extreme by abolishing tort liability
altogether ... [Ilosses would be reduced, but there would be no market for insurance." Id. at 17.
Mark Geistfeld has similarly pointed out that while insurers have at times joined with manufac-
turers in supporting some tort reform proposals, such support has always been limited. See Mark
Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform, 72
Tux. L. REv. 803, 839-42 (1993). Insurers are likely to favor "reforms that reduce the uncer-
tainty surrounding the potential for exceptionally large awards." Id. at 840. However, they are
unlikely to support reforms that limit the liability of manufacturers because such reforms would
also limit the market for liability insurance. Id. at 841.
30. Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Altenbernd, CJ.,
concurring).
2011] 703
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But it is worth remembering that insurance is a social institution. It
therefore does not follow that simply because risks can be insured as
an economic matter that society will embrace insurance for those
risks.
Consider the fact that liability insurance is a twentieth-century inno-
vation. Moreover, throughout most of the nineteenth century, there
was vehement opposition to the concept of providing insurance
against a person's negligent actions. As Willard Phillips wrote in his
1823 Treatise on the Law of Insurance, insurance against losses volun-
tarily incurred "seems to be so obviously opposed to the general inter-
est of a community, that it could hardly be enforced by any legal
tribunal."3 ' Indeed, prior to the industrial revolution, insurance was
not available for tort liability because it was thought to create moral
hazard by encouraging negligent behavior.32 It was not until "the
dawn of the twentieth century [that] the courts were rejecting the con-
cern that liability insurance would so undermine safety incentives that
this new form of insurance was against public policy." 33
More recently, controversy has surrounded the issue of the insura-
bility of punitive damages. While a majority of states in fact do permit
insurance for punitive damages, several-including New York-have
a resolute public policy prohibition on such insurance. 34
This backdrop is critical for evaluating Professor Sebok's argument
regarding champerty, a form of third-party litigation investment. Pro-
fessor Sebok sets out to refute the argument that champerty is a form
of gambling-one of several reasons courts have used to denigrate or
outlaw the practice.35 Instead, he posits that insurance is a closer
31. WILLARD Piiiu-ws, TREATISE ON -HE LAW OF INSURANCE 158 (1823).
32. As Kenneth Abraham explains, during this period, "the tension between insurance seen as
a social good and insurance . . . as an encouragement of morally suspect behavior was mani-
fested." KENNETHI S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM
THr PRoGRE-ssiviE ERA 10 9/11, at 21 (2008). It makes sense that industrialization preceded the
growth of insurance. The need for insurance is much less in an agrarian society, where most
injuries occurred on the farm and most potential defendants were family members. Moreover,
prior to the introduction of railroad systems, transportation injuries were relatively infrequent.
See id. at 20. Professor Rabin briefly discusses the advent of liability insurance during the period
when "tort matured ... as an economic buttress for re-shaping the influence of tort." Rabin,
supra note 1, at 438 n.35.
33. Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an
Idea, 64 Mo. L. REv. 573, 584 (2005).
34. Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 Mo. L. REv.
409, 427 n.92, app. at 458-59 (listing states prohibiting insurance for punitive damages).
35. It is interesting to note a parallel here-namely, in the pre-industrialization period in the
United States, when the legal status of insurance was murky, it was tolerated but viewed as being
"like gambling." ABRAHAM, supra note 32, at 20; see also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of
Moral Hazard, 75 Ti-x. L. Ri'v. 237, 257 (1996) (finding evidence from images, advertisements,
and popular references to insurance from the late 1800s that "the [insurance is gambling] objec-
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analogy. Professor Sebok's analysis raises an intriguing question re-
garding what precisely separates insurance from gambling. It may
well be, as Professor Sebok suggests, that the difference lies in the
primary purpose-that of insurance being to neutralize an already ex-
isting chance. This suggests that an insurance bet is a type of hedge,
which most forms of gambling are not. But, the converse does not
hold, in that all hedges are not forms of insurance. The collective
method of insurance is a key attribute. Insurance combines, averages,
and distributes risks and losses, such that it is neither a zero-sum game
nor simply a mechanism for shifting risk and loss. 3 6 Insurance may
also fulfill a "risk management" role; inspections, for example, which
are often part-and-parcel of an insurance agreement may serve a risk-
reduction (in addition to risk-spreading) function. Consider, for ex-
ample, terrorism insurance, which (to some) may seem to be the form
of insurance most closely approximating gambling. Here, "[i]nsurers
play key but often hidden roles in establishing preventive security and
loss prevention infrastructures, whether based on environmental de-
sign, electronic surveillance technologies, or private security
operatives."37
But in the final analysis, even were Professor Sebok able to cloak
the practice of champerty with the nomenclature of insurance, he still
would not have established the social viability of the practice. Per-
haps the most striking take-away from Professor Sebok's article is a
reminder of the limits on the pursuit of predictability. Insurance is not
simply the given end in what Professor Rabin describes as a "quest for
predictable assessment of risk."3 8 Should champerty be allowed as a
form of insurance for plaintiffs, as Professor Sebok's analysis sug-
gests? If so, it is not because we (or courts) are persuaded that it is
not a form of gambling. Nor does its social acceptability hinge on
whether it is termed insurance, as the historical debate over liability
insurance and more recent debates over insurance for punitive dam-
tion resonated in the moral climate of this time"); Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or
How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 CoLtum. L. Rrv. 1096,
1099-1100 (2000) ("Early insurance schemes were relatively straightforward forms of gambling,
with people insuring against the death of public figures with whom they had no personal
relationship.").
36. In his trenchant analysis of the history of insurance, Kenneth Abraham points out that late
nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century cases viewed liability insurance as a form of risk-
transfer, similar to risk indemnification. See AB3RAIAM, Supra note 32, at 32. It was not until the
debates surrounding workers' compensation transpired that courts began to consider the risk-
spreading role. See id.
37. Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle, Catastrophic Risk, Insurance and Terrorism, 33
ECON. & Soc'y 135, 139 (2004).
38. Rabin, supra note 1, at 444.
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ages illustrate. The historical and more contemporary insurance de-
bates focus on whether societal interests in deterrence and retribution
are well served by allowing such insurance (in addition to other more
pragmatic factors such as the demand and supply of such services). In
similar fashion, the debate surrounding champerty should cut to the
core. In closing, Professor Sebok gestures in this direction, with his
statement that "as a functional matter, the [champerty] contract
serves a socially useful function." But this should be the launching
point of the analysis, not the conclusory end.
IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN ON PREDICTABILITY
State-law torts are not supposed to fall within the province of the
U.S. Supreme Court. And yet, increasingly, the Court has made in-
roads in areas long thought to be the purview of the states. Professor
Rabin and Professor Zipursky offer views of potential federal incur-
sions into two different state law tort domains: punitive damages and
emotional distress and privacy torts. Each encapsulates the U.S. Su-
preme Court's zest for predictability and demonstrates where the
Court's enthusiasm might ultimately lead. The stakes are high. As
Professor Zipursky succinctly puts it, should the Court offer up "what
is in essence a jurisprudential critique," such an approach would
stymie the development of the common law of torts.39
A. Punitive Damages
Concern about predictability drove the U.S. Supreme Court's most
recent punitive damages decision. In Exxon Shipping v. Baker,40 after
decades of interventions justified by procedural or substantive due
process, at long last the Court gave its definitive diagnosis of what ails
punitive damages: "The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredict-
ability of punitive awards." 41 The Court's commitment is to the rule-
of-law conception of predictability and fairness: treating like cases
alike, such that "even Justice Holmes's 'bad man' can look ahead with
some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of
action or another." 42
Though (as discussed above in Part II), predictability is often a code
word for disillusionment with "crushing liability," the Court insisted
that "[a] survey of the literature reveals that discretion to award puni-
39. Zipursky, supra note 3, at 475.
40. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
41. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 502.
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tive damages has not mass-produced runaway awards." 43 Instead, the
Court found "an overall restraint" on the part of juries." But perhaps
the Court protests too much. Deep skepticism of the role of the jury
and its capacity to transform its expression of moral outrage into dol-
lar values pervades most criticisms of punitive damages.
The Court's fixation on unpredictability, moreover, can be linked to
a broader trend in its jurisprudence of circumscribing the role of the
civil jury in the name of certainty, predictability, and efficiency. The
Court cannot alter tort doctrine directly, for example, by transforming
standards into fixed rules. But, it can-and does-pursue predictabil-
ity via shifts in the allocation of decision-making power.45
In 2003, Professor Arthur Miller wrote the definitive piece on the
Court's civil litigation reform project designed to rein in the vagaries
of jury decision making: The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Liti-
gation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clich6s Eroding
Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?46 Since then, the
Court has proceeded further down this road, most recently with the
restrictive pleading standards imposed in Twombly and Iqbal.47 With
each successive step in this project, the Court has pushed its regula-
tion earlier in the pre-trial phase-a point emphasized by Richard
Nagareda-and Arthur Miller has warned that the resulting early ter-
mination of cases deprive claimants of their right to resolution by a
jury trial.48
In Exxon Shipping, given that the Court was sitting as a common
law court of last resort (under admiralty jurisdiction), the Court was
43. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 498-99.
45. Professor Rabin mentions in passing two additional examples of shifts in power from ju-
ries to judges. One (which I have already discussed in the text above) is Judge Cardozo's de-
ployment of negligence per se. The second example is that of courts' blurring the distinction
between no duty and no negligence as a matter of law with the resulting obfuscation, according
to Professor Rabin, that courts (as opposed to juries) determine what constitutes reasonable
care.
46. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liabil-
ity Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
47. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
48. For a discussion of these two cases as a departure from the model of litigation established
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to
lqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010). For a
discussion of the cases as being part of the Court's ongoing civil litigation reform effort but as
representing a new emphasis on cost imposition rather than variance-and as not so far removed
from the "ethos" of the Rules-see Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All over Again? Pre-Trial as
Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647 (2011). Nagareda notes, however, that the
decisions position courts as regulators while simultaneously depriving them of the information
necessary to deploy regulation. Id. at 28-29.
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freer than ever before (when it has always been hemmed in by the
constraints of substantive or procedural due process) to unleash its
criticism of punitive damages as a policy matter.49 Given this unique
window into the Court's policy view-and in light of its previous civil
litigation reform efforts-it is fitting to consider how far the Court's
zeal to control unpredictability in the civil justice system might be
taken. When contemplating the need for a quantitative limit on puni-
tive damages, the Court doubted the capacity of instructions to guide
the jury decision-making process with enough precision: "Instructions
can go just so far in promoting systemic consistency when awards are
not tied to specifically proven items of damage (the cost of medical
treatment, say)."50 The Court's concerns about the indeterminate and
unmoored nature of the jury's determination of punitive damages
would seem to apply full stop to the jury's determination of
noneconomic, pain-and-suffering damages. Moreover, noneconomic
damages are comprised of "soft" components like mental anguish and
pain and suffering-i.e., not "specifically proven items" like medical
costs and lost wages.51
In the face of such dire predictions, Professor Rabin offers sobriety.
To begin, Professor Rabin voices a firm conviction that, in the realm
of fixing compensatory damages, "the judiciary has been singleminded
in resisting the allure of imposing structure on case-by-case decision
making." 52 Professor Rabin proclaims the "impregnable fortress of
make-whole, case-by-case decision making" safe from judicial inter-
meddling.53 He adds an "afterword" on punitive damages, but main-
tains that the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's verve for
intervention will be inherently limited. As an initial matter, Professor
Rabin reminds us that Exxon Shipping was decided under admiralty
jurisdiction (not as a constitutional matter), "which is an open invita-
49. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive
Damages, 7 U. S r. THOMAS L.J. 25, 31-34 (2009).
50. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008).
51. Id.
52. Here, I quibble with the resoluteness of the claim. For the practice of remittitur is alive
and well. See, e.g., David Baldus, John C. MacQueen & George Woodworth, Improving Judicial
Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Re-
view of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IowA L. Rv. 1109, 1119
(1995) (stating that state courts "routinely apply additur/remittittur review" and federal courts
"frequently" employ remittitur); Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remitti-
tur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 Ono S-r. L.J. 731, 732 (2003) (noting "widespread use" of
remittitur in federal courts). While concededly not as structured as a set damages schedule, such
practices nonetheless have a similar effect in terms of constraining individual damages determi-
nations in light of aggregate practices.
53. Rabin, supra note 1, at 452.
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tion [to lower courts] to limit its reach."5 4 Given that lower courts are
not bound to follow Exxon Shipping as precedent, Professor Rabin
submits that the case's broader influence will stand or fall on its per-
suasive power-which Professor Rabin (with generous citation to an
article of mine, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on
Punitive Damages) points out is weak. Notwithstanding our agree-
ment here, I am not as sanguine as Professor Rabin that lower courts
will resist the tide of the U.S. Supreme Court's advances. The evi-
dence to date is mixed. Several lower courts have relegated Exxon
Shipping to the annals of admiralty.55 But other courts have internal-
ized the Court's impulse to rein in punitive awards and have cited
Exxon Shipping in a wider array of cases. 56 It will also come as no
surprise to Professor Rabin that the lower courts do not always share
the academic's view of the lack of persuasiveness of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Indeed, at least the early returns seem to suggest that state
courts are less persuaded than federal courts, setting up an interesting
federalism dynamic.57
B. Emotional Distress and Privacy Torts
Continuing the theme of the U.S. Supreme Court's making inroads
into traditional domains of state tort law, Professor Benjamin Zipur-
sky's article, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture
of Tort Law, explores the potential for the Court to wield the First
54. Id.
55. See Sharkey, supra note 49, at 32 n.32 (citing an array of "federal and state courts [which]
have signaled a desire to limit the Court's 1:1 ratio to the realm of federal admiralty and have
refused to impose a 1:1 ratio as a matter of constitutional due process"). Moreover, "[sltate
courts have been slightly more emphatic in their rejection of attempts to extend the reach of
Exxon Shipping beyond federal maritime." Id.
56. See id. at 33 n.33 (citing cases in which other "[I]ower courts have taken the cue from the
U.S. Supreme Court and have begun to cite Exxon Shipping, along with Gore, Campbell, and
Williams in their constitutional due process excessiveness review-even while acknowledging
that, by its terms, Exxon Shipping is limited to federal admiralty"); see also Jurinko v. Med.
Protective Co., 305 F. App'x 13, 27 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008) (describing that the Court used Exxon to
signal to lower courts that 1:1 ratio "may well be" the constitutional limit on punitive damages
(quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 n.28 (2008)); Sharkey, supra note 49, at
34 & nn. 37-40 (discussing cases in which lower courts "have gravitated ... [toward] Exxon
Shipping's 1:1 ratio full stop in constitutional due process review of punitive damages" in antici-
pation that the Court will reach such a holding in its next punitive damages case).
57. 1 have argued that the Court's single-minded focus on unpredictability almost inexorably
drives it to embrace and reinforce an exclusively retributive rationale for punitive damages (by
equating punitive damages and criminal sentencing). See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incur-
sions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 wILLAM-
Irr; L. REv. 449 (2010). By elevating a single punitive damages goal-that of retributive
punishment-the Court sets the stage for a clash with state courts and legislatures who might be
inspired to define their legitimate state interests in punitive damages differently. Id.
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Amendment to chip away at the common law torts of intrusion upon
seclusion and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Pro-
fessor Zipursky strikes out against the First Amendment enthusiasts
(Professor Eugene Volokh most prominently among them) who have
raised "what is in essence a jurisprudential critique: that the vagueness
of the tort of . . IIED creates so much uncertainty and pliability that
it should be struck down."58 Professor Zipursky believes such criti-
ques fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the open texture of
tort law. In a postscript on the Supreme Court's decision in Snyder,
he offers a plea that the Court not go further down the road of defin-
ing a hard-edged constitutional boundary to the duties and obligations
of tort law.
Professor Zipursky concedes that the U.S. Supreme Court has a
valid role to play in terms of policing state tort law end runs around
constitutional principles.59 In this vein, he sees a role for the Court's
skepticism of "a slap-dash pasting of facts about politically odd, un-
conventional, and provocative speech onto a newfangled, random
torts framework." 60 But, Professor Zipursky is at pains to convince
that the IIED tort, by contrast, fits within the body of principles and
concepts with some integrity within the common law.
Delving into the core meaning of IIED, Professor Zipursky invokes
the standards-versus-rules debate (which features so prominently in
Professor Rabin's article). In Snyder, the Supreme Court expressed
concern with the required element of "outrageousness," which the
Court characterized as a "highly malleable standard [that] . . . 'allows
a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or
perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression." 6 1 But,
Professor Zipursky counters, there is inherent value in an open-tex-
tured standard such as "outrageousness." As Professor Zipursky
elaborates, both the offensiveness at the heart of a privacy claim and
the outrageousness at the heart of an emotional distress claim are
"morally charged" concepts given over to a jury to decide. 62
58. Zipursky, supra note 3, at 475.
59. Though not mentioned by Professor Zipursky, the greater "end run" threat of IIED may
be to statutorily prescribed damage limitations. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting
Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 J. EmiIcAi LEGoA.
S-ruo. 1, 39 (2006) (studying the effect of inclusion of state tort claims on the application of Title
VII damage limitations in sexual harassment cases and noting that "[a]fter controlling for myriad
independent variables ... the inclusion of a state tort law claim is associated with, on average, a
$137,176 increase in total damages and a $136,021 increase in outrage damages").
60. Zipursky, supra note 3, at 477.
61. Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, slip. op. at 16 (Mar. 2, 2011) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
62. Zipursky, supra note 3, at 475.
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Professor Zipursky's celebration of the open-textured standard call-
ing forth the jury's fresh moral judgments is reminiscent of Professor
Seana Shiffrin's argument highlighting the value of standards in call-
ing for moral deliberation among the populace. 63 Professor Shiffrin
argues that moral and democratic deliberative purposes are served by
these features of standards that are not necessarily served by precise
rules. In a nutshell, open-ended standards encourage greater levels of
moral deliberation. We must ask ourselves whether we are treating
one another fairly or not, whether we are taking due care, et cetera,
rather than rotely applying a rule.
Professor Rabin's analysis of historical tort trends provides some
additional insight on Professor Zipursky's subject matter. Professor
Rabin describes a kind of equilibrium reached, with open-textured lia-
bility standards reined in, on the margins, by various no-duty rules. In
the abstract, the IIED tort may embody similar compromise forces in
a different guise. It is a fairly modern tort, recognized officially in The
Restatement (Second) of Torts only in 1948.64 Its subjective, open-tex-
tured standard for liability is combined with sharp restrictions, as Pro-
fessor Zipursky himself recognizes. 65 Indeed, the early proponents of
IIED advocated strict limitations on the tort, particularly on the signa-
ture injury, defined as severe emotional distress, and the "outrageous-
ness" requirement. 66 Given the internal policing of the tort,67 the
63. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of
Fog, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1214 (2010).
64. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Even-
handedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 CoLum. L.
REV. 42, 43 (1982). Prior to the official recognition of IlED, plaintiffs (with some notable excep-
tions) could recover for emotional distress only as a form of "parasitic" damages-that is, if they
could "peg" their mental damage claim to another independent tort, "no matter how technical it
might be." William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Micii.
L. REV. 874, 880 (1938).
65. Professor Zipursky discusses the built-in limitations that are part of the IlED tort and the
rigorous self-policing by courts throughout his article. See Zipursky, supra note 3, at 476-77,
498, 500-01, 504-05.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oiF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also Prosser, supra note 64, at 879
("What we are dealing with, in other words, is outrageous conduct, of a kind especially calcu-
lated to cause serious mental and emotional disturbance. It is the character of such conduct
itself which provides the necessary assurance that genuine harm has been done, and that it is so
important as to be entitled to redress.").
67. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the
Private Employment Sector, 21 HoESTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 112 (2003) ("[M]ost states set a
very high legal and factual standard for the common law tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress."); see also Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 579, 589 (1993) ("Courts adjudicating intentional infliction cases generally have
followed the Restatement formulation ... both in tone and in letter."). But see Givelber, supra
note 64, at 43 ("The [lIED] tort ... has become an instrument for judicial tinkering.... The very
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need for external limitations imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court may
be correspondingly limited.68
V. CONCLUSION
Common law torts were once kept in their place by the predomi-
nance of contract and property law principles. With the relaxation of
contract and property-based restraints, in the form of no-duty rules,
and the revolutionary expansion of open-textured liability standards,
renewed efforts were directed at restraining the twin evils of "flood-
gates liability" and "crushing liability." Professor Rabin suggests that
a point of stasis may have been reached-an equipoise characterized
by the predominance of liability standards, reined in by no-duty rules
and a reluctance to give birth to new torts. Professor Sebok's explora-
tion of courts' resistance to champerty provides a vivid illustration of
the doctrinal limits on the quest for predictability, while at the same
time serving as a reminder of the creative possibilities of insurance
expanding into new realms. The U.S. Supreme Court has emerged as
the newest player on the scene, ramping up its efforts to restrain the
vicissitudes of common law tort in the name of predictability. The
efficacy of its efforts, as described by Professors Rabin and Zipursky,
is, at present, a story without an ending.
indeterminacy of the tort has .. . free[d] courts of the necessity of rationalizing results in terms of
rules of universal applicability."); Hayden, supra, at 593 ("[T]he tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress opens the door to uniquely freewheeling and unfettered condemnation of
antisocial conduct. Its breadth and vagueness, both as to the kind of conduct that is actionable
and to the amount and kind of damages that may be recovered, have never been limited signifi-
cantly, as many courts and commentators have recognized." (footnotes omitted)).
68. In Snyder, Justice Samuel Alito agreed, see Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, slip. op. at 2
(Mar. 2, 2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing lIED as a "very narrow tort"), but the over-
whelming majority of the Court concluded otherwise.
[Vol. 60:695712
